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Abstract
The usage of process choreographies and decentralized Business Process Management Systems has been named as an alternative
to centralized business process orchestration. In choreographies, control over a process instance is shared between independent
parties, and no party has full control or knowledge during process runtime. Nevertheless, it is necessary to monitor and verify
process instances during runtime for purposes of documentation, accounting, or compensation.
To achieve business process runtime verification, this work explores the suitability of the Bitcoin blockchain to create a novel
solution for choreographies. The resulting approach is realized in a fully-functional software prototype. This software solution is
evaluated in a qualitative comparison. Findings show that our blockchain-based approach enables a seamless execution monitoring
and verification of choreographies, while at the same time preserving anonymity and independence of the process participants.
Furthermore, the prototype is evaluated in a performance analysis.
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1. Introduction
Business Process Management (BPM) comprises methods
and concepts to model, execute, monitor, configure, and ad-
ministrate the processes which are at the core of a company’s
business. These processes are made up from a set of activities
(or tasks) which together fulfill a business goal [1]. The compo-
sition and control of such a set of activities can either be done
in a centralized way (orchestration), where the process owner
has full control and knowledge about all tasks at all points of
time, or in a decentralized way (choreography), where process
control is handed over from the process owner to other process
participants and no partner has full control and knowledge of
the process [2]. In a choreography, each involved participant
receives information about the negotiated terms and require-
ments of a designated part of the choreography and then acts
independently [3].
Choreographies are especially important for inter-
organizational settings, where it is not possible to estab-
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: c.prybila@infosys.tuwien.ac.at (Christoph
Prybila), s.schulte@infosys.tuwien.ac.at (Stefan Schulte),
c.hochreiner@infosys.tuwien.ac.at (Christoph Hochreiner),
ingo.weber@data61.csiro.au (Ingo Weber)
lish a centralized process control because of organizational
boundaries [2]. Furthermore, in very large settings, a central
Business Process Management System (BPMS) may become a
bottleneck [4]. Choreographies, which are executed in a highly
decentralized manner, help to mitigate this scalability issue [3].
Especially in Business to Business (B2B) settings, contracts
are at the core of processes [5]. A process contract describes
the terms of the collaboration between different entities, i.e.,
the obligations and rights of all process participants, and the
rules applying to process execution. Such a contract is attached
to a process instance. In the case of choreographies, records
about the decentralized execution of a process are the basis for
contract verification. This documentation must be indisputable
and accepted by all choreography participants [6]. It can then be
used to enforce the contract underlying a choreography. Based
on this, a process owner can penalize a process participant in
case of the incorrect execution of an activity. At the same time,
a participant can claim payment from the process owner for the
participation in the execution of a process, since the execution
of an activity is documented.
To enable this kind of documentation, a choreography-
oriented BPMS must incorporate an end-to-end process veri-
fication mechanism. Verification is defined as the “evalua-
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tion of whether or not a product, service, or system complies
with a regulation, requirement, specification, or imposed con-
dition” [7]. With regard to business processes, we define run-
time verification as the evaluation whether a process execution
meets the functional and non-functional objectives defined in a
contract between the process participants. A feature like this
enhances the overall trust into the robustness of choreographies
and the acceptance of the overall process-based cooperation be-
tween the involved participants.
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin document and verify con-
ducted payments in a decentralized ledger, called block-
chain [8]. Through cryptographic security measures, the funds
of each single party are protected. During the process of pay-
ing another party, both parties must have undeniable proof that
the correct amount of money was indeed sent. Blockchains are
not maintained by a single financial institution but by a large
number of small and independent peers, called miners [9]. This
increases the trust in a blockchain as an independent institution.
Both choreography-oriented BPM and cryptocurrencies face
similar challenges when performing verification. The parties
involved in cryptocurrency payment transfers are independent
and mostly even anonymous. Nevertheless, payments which
have been conducted must be permanent and indisputable [10].
Choreography participants are also independent, and in some
cases even potential competitors [11]. Hence, the performed
tasks of a choreography process instance must also be perma-
nently documented in a trusted way. For this, the utilization
of a blockchain for choreography-oriented BPM appears to be
a promising approach. The goal of the work presented in this
paper is therefore to determine the suitability of blockchains to
serve as trust basis for decentralized and indisputable runtime
verification for choreography-oriented BPM.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We examine the usage of the blockchain technology as
means to establish trust and to allow verification of cho-
reographies. For this, we discuss different runtime verific-
ation approaches and briefly evaluate the properties of ex-
isting blockchains regarding their suitability for this task.
• We develop a blockchain-based runtime verification ap-
proach and implement a fully-functional prototype which
is able to verify running process instances using the Bit-
coin blockchain.
• We evaluate the capabilities of the developed prototype in
a qualitative comparison and a performance analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we present background work on BPM and blockchains
and define prerequisites for our work. Afterwards, we discuss
the related work in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce our
approach to runtime verification in choreographies. We evalu-
ate the presented approach in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
this paper and provides a short outlook on our future work.
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Figure 1: Example Choreography, adapted from [2]
2. Background
The following subsections present background information
regarding the technical content of this paper. For this, we dis-
cuss BPM (Section 2.1) and blockchains (Section 2.2). Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the basic structure of Bitcoin transactions.
Afterwards, we define prerequisites for our work (Section 2.4).
2.1. Business Process Management
Classic approaches to BPM are usually based on a central-
ized BPMS, which orchestrates business processes [2]. Such
a BPMS becomes the single contact point for all process in-
stances [12]. More recent approaches propose a different so-
lution where multiple services communicate directly with each
other in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion and the responsibility for
process control is shared between different entities, i.e., pro-
cesses are choreographed [13, 14]. In such settings, there is no
need for a centralized BPMS.
Choreographies distribute the control of executed process in-
stances to different independent process participants. Each par-
ticipant receives information about the negotiated terms and re-
quirements of a designated part of the choreography and then
acts independently. Messages are exchanged directly in a P2P
fashion between the involved participants. This design removes
single points of failure as well as messaging bottlenecks [3].
Choreography-oriented BPM especially benefits use cases in-
volving B2B cooperation [1], where inter-organizational pro-
cesses need to be executed. In such settings, companies often
hesitate to open their systems to partners [5, 15], which would
be needed to orchestrate a process and have global knowledge
about a process’ status. An example choreography is illustrated
in Figure 1.
The choreography approach creates several opportunities
compared to centralized orchestrations. By distributing con-
trol and execution, scalability and robustness are improved [12].
Also, choreographies are a promising solution for inter-
organizational processes to bridge information gaps caused by
organizational borders between process participants.
At the same time, choreographies create new challenges. De-
centralized execution requires process participants to hand over
the control of process instances to remote partners. The formed
cooperation contracts need to be verifiable to make them en-
forceable for accounting and compensation purposes. Further-
more, process owners must be able to trace the execution path
of a process instance across the boundaries of the different pro-
cess participants. At the same time, a participant has to be able
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to proof its participation in a choreography. The collected infor-
mation must be trustworthy to serve as legal basis for contract
enforcement.
Today, a dedicated runtime verification approach for choreo-
graphies, which fulfills the requirements stated above, is miss-
ing [16, 17] (see Section 3). Hence, new solutions need to
be found. As outlined in Section 1, we therefore propose a
blockchain-based approach to enable runtime verification for
choreographies.
2.2. Blockchain
The original blockchain concept stems from the cryptocur-
rency Bitcoin [18], which aims to provide a decentralized
mechanism for the anonymous exchange of digital money. One
particular issue with regard to digital money is the double
spending problem, i.e., a malicious or faulty party could dupli-
cate digital money tokens and spend them multiple times [10].
Therefore, it is necessary that the amount of money one party
holds is recorded in a ledger. A digital payment transfer can
then be conducted by reducing the balance in one party’s ledger
while increasing the balance of another party’s ledger.
These ledgers must be managed by a trusted institution. With
regard to cryptocurrencies’ goal to achieve total anonymity of
payers and payees, there should be no central party who con-
trols the balances of ledgers and the transfer of money between
two particular parties. Hence, in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin,
book-keeping and verification of payment transfers is not con-
trolled by one particular party (or a group of parties), but by a
vast number of independent parties, the so-called miners, which
together operate a blockchain [8]. In the following paragraphs,
the basic technical approach of the Bitcoin blockchain is dis-
cussed. Other well-known first generation blockchains, e.g.,
the Litecoin blockchain, are based on the same basic princi-
ples, while so-called second generation blockchains extend the
possible application areas (see below) [10].
A blockchain is represented by a chain of transactions [18].
In Bitcoin, these transactions are public [8]. Hence, every-
one can fetch the historical transaction data and determine how
many funds are associated with certain Bitcoin addresses and
what payment transfers have been conducted. Anonymity is
achieved through the abstraction of Bitcoin addresses.
When a transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin network, it
is first verified and then added into a new block. New blocks
are placed on top of the previous transaction history, i.e., the
blockchain. As a result, the blockchain provides an unchange-
able history of all Bitcoin transactions. As the name points
out, the blockchain consists of a series of interconnected data
blocks. Each block contains a number of transactions as well as
a link to the previous block, incentive information, and a proof
of work [9].
Importantly for some design decisions made in the work at
hand, blockchains are categorized into first generation and sec-
ond generation blockchains [19]. The first operating block-
chains were designed to serve a single main purpose and have
limited adaptability for other use cases. They are referred to as
first generation blockchains, e.g., Bitcoin or Litecoin.
Recent implementations of second generation blockchains
like Ethereum do not intentionally limit the use cases that can
be addressed. By providing an open programming environment
in their blockchains, they aim to support and facilitate various
use cases. Hence, Ethereum is not limited to supporting a cryp-
tocurrency and enables so-called smart contracts. These con-
tracts are program agents that are executed within the Ethereum
environment. They are defined in a Turing-complete scripting
language and enriched with private storage as well as monetary
balance. During its execution, a contract is able to interact with
its storage, send messages, and create other contracts.
On the one hand, the open nature of Ethereum is certainly
suited to support new prototypes, but on the other hand, the
Ethereum blockchain currently suffers from major stability is-
sues. In contrast, the Bitcoin blockchain on the other hand has
proven to be the most mature and robust framework among all
blockchains. Our runtime verification prototype is therefore
based on the Bitcoin blockchain. An in-depth discussion about
the blockchain selection can be found in Section 3.
2.3. Basic Bitcoin Transactions
Bitcoin transactions are tailored to conduct payments. A
common transaction is composed of an input section and an
output section. The owner of a Bitcoin has access to the output
of the latest transaction in which the corresponding Bitcoin was
used. To spend the Bitcoin, the owner has to issue a transaction
in which the output of the previously latest transaction becomes
the input to a new transaction [10]. The payer (i.e., the transac-
tion sender) specifies the new owner of the Bitcoin by directing
the output of the new transaction to a specific Bitcoin address.
Since the output of the previously latest transaction now has
been used, it is considered spent and cannot be used as input
for another transaction. After creating the overall transaction
information, the data is signed by the private key of the payer’s
Bitcoin address and broadcast to the Bitcoin network to become
part of the blockchain [20].
A standard Bitcoin transaction can have multiple inputs and
outputs [8]. Thus, the input of a single new transaction can be
composed of multiple parts referencing the outputs of multiple
old transactions. Likewise, the resulting amount of a transac-
tion can be split into multiple output parts. These output parts
can then be distributed to multiple Bitcoin addresses. This en-
ables the payer to pay multiple parties at once and to receive
change at the same time.
The technical mechanics of a standard transaction are as
follows: Output parts are sums of Bitcoins paired with small
scripts written in a custom scripting language. These scripts
guard the funds associated with the output. To access an output
part, the corresponding script must be supplied with a parame-
ter that renders its result to true [8]. The structure of a Bitcoin
transaction is well-defined. Most fields expect specific content
and have fixed lengths. The included scripts are the only excep-
tion. They do not have fixed field lengths and their content can
in theory be defined arbitrarily.
Nevertheless, most scripts follow certain patterns. The most
common script requires a signature as input, created from the
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payee’s Bitcoin private key. Only the holder of the correspond-
ing private key is able to create the required signature, thus
making the output only accessible to the owner of the destined
Bitcoin address [9]. The input part of a transaction only con-
tains a reference to its corresponding originating output part and
the necessary parameters to render the script of the output to
true. Through this mechanism, everybody receiving a broad-
cast transaction can verify if the transaction is really authorized
to access the specified outputs.
While the Bitcoin blockchain was established for a specific
use case, its original design provides various possibilities to cre-
ate experimental transactions. We will exploit these possibili-
ties for our process runtime verification approach presented in
Section 4.1.
2.4. Prerequisites
The following paragraphs define some prerequisites and set-
tings for our work.
Despite the lack of centralized control in a choreography, we
assume that there is always a process owner, who initiates a
business process, shares the process model with all participants,
and is paying for its successful decentralized execution [5].
The functional and non-functional execution constraints and
monetary rewards of a process activity are defined by the pro-
cess owner, in many cases described as Service Level Agree-
ments (SLAs), and realized in a contract between process owner
and process participants. This bundled process information is
shared among all choreography partners.
With regard to choreographies, we assume that the involved
parties are reluctant to share information about their identities,
data, or internal business structures [6, 11]. However, the pro-
cess owner requires information about the executed decentral-
ized process activities. Most importantly, the process owner
needs to know which activities have been fulfilled by which
partners and how long the execution took [17, 19]. For this, es-
pecially the handover of the control of a process instance must
be documented in an undeniable way and must be accessible for
the process owner. Since decentralization is inherent to choreo-
graphies, there is no centralized control and knowledge about
process instances.
We assume that the selection of choreography participants
is highly flexible and allows the selection of partners during
process runtime. This enables, e.g., to replace one process par-
ticipant (respectively the activity to be executed by the parti-
cipant) during the runtime of a process.
For this, certain assumptions are made. It is assumed that the
process owner initially hands over the execution of the process
to a suitable partner to have a specific process activity executed.
To accomplish this, the process owner first selects the next suit-
able choreography participant. This participant is either prede-
fined or chosen based on the required service and the defined
SLA. If selected ad hoc, the process owner and the selected
potential cooperation partner negotiate the terms of the hand-
over. These selection and negotiation steps are well-covered
in Service-oriented Architectures (SOA), e.g., [21], and will
therefore not be discussed in-depth in this paper. After a pro-
cess participant has finished the execution of the defined task,
the control over the process execution is passed along to the
next choreography participant. This is done by employing the
previously described selection and negotiation steps.
Notably, all process participants remain independent orga-
nizations and are potential competitors [11]. That is why one
goal for runtime verification is to keep mutual dependencies to
a minimum. Nevertheless, the handover of a process instance
to another participant together with the achieved progress must
be documented. For this, no centralized invasive monitoring
service can be used, since such monitoring would introduce
a tighter coupling and increased requirement for information
sharing between the participants of a choreography.
Finally, we do not limit the kinds of processes or tasks sup-
ported by our runtime verification approach. Tasks can be
software-based services or real-world activities. As long as it
is possible to monitor the handover between the process parti-
cipants that offer the respective tasks (e.g., by a decentralized
BPMS), our approach is able to verify process executions.
3. Related Work
The monitoring of choreographies has been investigated
from different angles. Norta et al. argue that as a foundation
for choreography monitoring, it is first necessary to negotiate
a contract between the parties involved [5]. For this, a markup
language is provided which supports the exchange of choreo-
graphy contracts. This language allows to define what moni-
toring information should be provided by which choreography
participant and how this information is shared and accessed.
In addition to contractual definitions, monitoring in decen-
tralized process execution needs to be defined during choreo-
graphy modeling. Ansseuw et al. provide an extension to the
standard BPMN 2.0 monitoring injection points to support cho-
reographies [16]. Wetzstein et al. also propose a technology-
driven approach to enable choreography monitoring by ex-
tending BPEL4Chor with an event-oriented monitoring agree-
ment [15]. To address privacy concerns of process participants,
events can only be defined based on a publicly available pro-
cess model. How each participant maps public choreography
activities to internal processes remains hidden. None of the ap-
proaches discussed so far makes use of a decentralized ledger
to store and distribute monitoring data in a trustworthy way.
Notably, if this is supported at all, it is necessary to explicitly
define which data is shared with whom.
With regard to runtime verification of choreography execu-
tions, two general approaches have been proposed: von Riegen
and Ritter [11] propose the usage of multiple Enterprise Ser-
vice Buses (ESBs) to handle all communication between the
cooperating parties. The authors suggest the usage of proxies
which intercept all communication and log all necessary infor-
mation in a central component. A similar approach is described
by Baouab et al. [6]. In their scenario, the cooperating par-
ticipants of a choreography are already chosen at deployment
time by the process owner. To guarantee the enforcement of
given policies, all participants must run the same communica-
tion gateways which intercept all traffic. If any deviations are
observed, events are emitted to notify the process owner.
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The second general approach to runtime verification of cho-
reography executions proposes token passing along the process
participants. By enhancing the token with cryptography fea-
tures, it becomes a proof for the path it traveled along. Through
keeping a copy, each partner can proof its participation in the
corresponding process instance. Upon receiving the corre-
sponding tokens, process owners are able to verify the exact
sequence of execution. Depending on the structure of a choreo-
graphy’s required data sources, this technique can also be used
to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. If the required data
can be sent along the choreography as a single document, the
document becomes the token upon which the security features
are applied. Examples for this approach have been presented,
e.g., in [17, 22, 23].
Message controlling and token passing are two approaches
for controlling and propagating the execution state of a choreo-
graphy. Both impose different challenges when being applied
to the scenario regarded in this paper. If loose coupling is a pri-
ority in the cooperation environments, the runtime verification
approach of message controlling becomes difficult. Commu-
nication frameworks like message buses can ensure that cho-
reography messages passed between the participants only use
the provided connectors. But to set up a such communica-
tion framework between partners, a tight integration between
the software systems becomes necessary, which also leads to
a high rigidity of the choreographies that can be supported by
these approaches. The token-based approach also introduces
new problems, since the controlling token might get lost. While
in theory in our approach also a private key could get lost, these
keys should not be shared between participants. Also, each par-
ticipant creates a unique private key for each transaction.
To avoid token loss, choreography runtime implementations
for BPMS like the ones presented by Martin et al. [24] and
Hwang et al. [25] save the tokens in a shared storage. This
shared storage then becomes the controlling entity for the sys-
tem. The shared storage must be operated by a trusted third
party, which does not fit the basic assumption of no centralized
source of trust in choreography-based BPM.
As described in the previous sections, we solved the prob-
lems of these approaches by using the Bitcoin blockchain as
the trusted entity for the choreography. In general, the usage
of blockchain in BPM is still at its very beginning [26]. Never-
theless, through its design, the blockchain can provide a shared
trust basis which is not under the control of a single organiza-
tion. Messages can be exchanged directly within blockchain
transactions and token information can be stored in the block-
chain by embedding them in transactions.
In parallel to the work at hand, Weber et al. proposed a
related approach. In this solution, Ethereum smart contracts
are used for runtime verification of choreographies [19]. For
this, the authors present a component which translates BPMN
models into smart contracts. Instantiated contracts become the
controlling entities of process instances and are able to control
and document all process activities. During the creation of an
instance contract, the public keys of the choreography’s par-
ticipants together with their corresponding roles must be pro-
vided. Partners do not communicate directly with each other.
Instead, they interact through transactions which are submit-
ted against an instance contract and its contract storage. These
transactions alter the state of the given contract and at the same
time advance the execution state of the given process instance.
Since all transactions are verified against the contract definition,
it can be ensured that only authorized participants can alter the
process state at a given execution point. Furthermore, the ex-
ecution sequence can be enforced to match the process defini-
tion. At last, all this information is publicly documented in the
Ethereum blockchain. Building on the initial paper, Garcia et
al. [27] present an improved version of the approach by Weber
et al. [19] in terms of cost efficiency, throughput, and latency.
The main downside of the seminal approach by Weber et al.
is that all participants of the choreography must be known in
advance. This is required to include the relevant public keys
and roles into a contract during its creation. This reduces the
flexibility of the overall choreography and makes the process
execution less robust. If one of the participants is unreliable
or becomes unreachable, the whole process execution may be
stuck. Without the public key and role information, access se-
curity and execution sequence enforcement are not possible.
While the approach proposed in this paper is based on the
Bitcoin blockchain, Weber et al. utilize the Ethereum block-
chain. The Ethereum blockchain provides great programmatic
freedom, however, there is a lack of systematic analyses of
Ethereum with regard to its stability and general quality, e.g.,
in terms of how the miners are distributed and if they are inde-
pendent from each other. The Ethereum blockchain has been
subject to heavy attacks in 2016, leading to several hard forks
to restabilize the blockchain and make it more secure.1 Be-
cause of these instabilities, it is currently not advisable to apply
the Ethereum blockchain in a B2B context, where stability and
trust are of uttermost importance.
In contrast, there have been quantitative and qualitative ana-
lyses of the Bitcoin network [20, 28]. In these analyses, the
authors have shown that the Bitcoin network is distributed
worldwide and that approximately 6,000 nodes form its reli-
able core [20]. Since the Ethereum blockchain is less mature
and less stable than the Bitcoin blockchain, we decided to uti-
lize the latter in the B2B scenario applied in the work at hand.
One particular issue of Bitcoin is however its limited scala-
bility. The Bitcoin project struggels to provide the transaction
throughput required for the current demand. To increase the
blockchain throughput, either the block size or the block cre-
ation frequency must be increased. Both factors influence the
network’s capability to synchronize in time [29]. This would
result in an increase in conflicting blocks [20] and a reduced
security level. While different solutions for this issue have been
researched, e.g., [30], none has been integrated yet into Bitcoin.
1https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/10/18/
faq-upcoming-ethereum-hard-fork/, accessed on 31.10.2016
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/11/18/
hard-fork-no-4-spurious-dragon/, accessed on 30.11.2016
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4. Runtime Verification for Choreographies
As described in Section 2, the Bitcoin blockchain offers a
promising basis to implement independent, decentralized, and
undeniable runtime verification for choreographies. This sec-
tion analyses this approach in more detail. In Section 4.1, we
present our conceptual approach to runtime verification. In
Section 4.2, we describe how we realize the conceptual solu-
tion with Bitcoin transactions, and in Section 4.3, a framework
which encapsulates the implementation is presented.
4.1. Conceptual Solution
4.1.1. Basic Approach
Because of our decision to make use of the Bitcoin block-
chain, only transaction techniques of existing first generation
blockchains are used, instead of utilizing smart contracts of sec-
ond generation blockchains like Ethereum. This limits the pos-
sible features but enables the usage of existing well-supported
and mature blockchains, like Bitcoin. On the downside, the
runtime verification proposal has to address the limited adapt-
ability (in terms of supported use cases by the original protocol)
and scalability (see Section 3) when using Bitcoin.
In our approach, a free Bitcoin output is selected by the pro-
cess owner at the start of a new process instance to serve as the
control token for the choreography. This control token stores
the execution state of the process. At the same time, the block-
chain becomes the decentralized storage for the token. Who-
ever is in possession of the token is responsible for the exe-
cution of a part of the choreography, i.e., an activity/task. To
enable parallelism in a process instance, the token can be split
and joined. Participants can document the progress of the pro-
cess and of the handover to other participants by submitting new
transactions which propagate the token.
Each transaction is enriched with additional metadata about
the current state of the process. Since Bitcoin transactions are
push-based, the token sender gives its approval of a handover
from one participant to another by publishing the respective
transaction. Nevertheless, also the approval of the token re-
ceiver must be documented in the transaction. Therefore, a sig-
nature of the token receiver is also embedded in the process
metadata stored in the transaction.
The transaction chain related to the token of a process in-
stance provides undeniable proof about the process’ progress.
If this progress somehow violates the agreements of the choreo-
graphy contract, penalties can be claimed by the process owner
from the involved participants. At the same time, it is possi-
ble for participants to prove their successful involvement in a
choreography to claim their rewards. To preserve the flexibil-
ity of the choreography, the participants are not predetermined
at process design time, but can be chosen dynamically during
process runtime. On the downside, this prevents the enforce-
ment of a correct process sequence. Still, it is not possible for
a single participant to forge critical blockchain entries. There-
fore, a process owner can monitor the progress of an instance
by observing the blockchain. If the execution of a certain pro-
cess instance deviates from the given process model, a process
owner and all other choreography participants of this instance
can detect this and react to it.
4.1.2. Token Information
To change a Bitcoin transaction into a documentation ele-
ment which proves that a process instance has been handed
over from one participant to another, it must provide the fol-
lowing characteristics: First, token handovers must be access-
protected. Only the current owner of a process token must be
able to decide whom to pass on the token. Since the token is es-
sentially an amount of Bitcoins, this kind of access protection
is already a built-in feature of Bitcoin. Each output of a Bitcoin
transaction is protected by a script which commonly requires a
Bitcoin signature of the owner as parameter. At the same time,
the receiver of the token must confirm that a handover, together
with the included metadata, is accepted. When the handover
documentation element is completed, signatures of both sender
and receiver must be contained.
The following information has to be included in the transac-
tion to document the state of the current process execution:
process id: To capture which instance is addressed by the
transaction, the identification number of the process must
be included.
next task id: A participant works on a specific process task
(i.e., activity) and then hands over the control of the pro-
cess to another participant to perform the next task. The
identification number of the task which should be per-
formed by the receiving participant must be included in
the transaction.
timestamp: This timestamp documents the point in time the
current task, processed by the sending participant, ends
and the following task, processed by the receiving parti-
cipant, starts. This is important to assess if deadlines have
been met.
process data hash: Most process instances require data to op-
erate on. This data is continuously altered by the fulfilled
process tasks. To document the current state of the pro-
cess data, a hash must be placed in the transaction. The
actual data transfer takes place off-chain, directly between
the involved participants.
receiver signature Not only the sender must confirm the hand-
over of a process, also the agreement of the receiver must
be documented. Therefore, the receiver must also sign the
transaction template before publishing. In this transaction
template, all the data described above must already be in-
cluded. This way, the receiver documents the approval to
receive control over the process instance under the docu-
mented conditions.
Finally, identification data of sender and receiver must be ex-
changed. By design, Bitcoin transactions are sent between Bit-
coin addresses. For the work at hand, new addresses are gen-
erated for each handover. These addresses are anonymous and
protect the privacy of the involved choreography participants.
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Figure 2: Intermediate Handover of a Process Instance between Choreography
Participants
Still, sender and receiver must be able to mutually prove their
handover. Therefore, it is assumed that besides the Bitcoin in-
frastructure, a RSA-based public key infrastructure (PKI) is in
place. By utilizing RSA-based signatures and certificates, a par-
ticipant can prove its identity to others [31]. When sender and
receiver want to perform a handover, they first have to share the
respective Bitcoin addresses they want to use. This exchange is
enriched with RSA-based signatures and certificates. This way,
each handover partner confirms the ownership to a given Bit-
coin address before the handover takes place. By storing the
received signature, a choreography participant can prove the
identity of the corresponding handover partner to the process
owner, if required.
4.1.3. Handover
The sequence diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the handover
process for runtime verification. The handover process contains
the following steps:
#1 The first step is common to all choreographies. After the
sending participant (here: Alice) has selected a potential
receiving participant (here: Bob), they mutually identify
each other and negotiate the metadata of the handover. No-
tably, Figure 2 simplifies the identification by only show-
ing how Alice identifies Bob, not vice versa.
#2 When a consensus is reached, the sender transfers the sym-
metrically encrypted process data to the receiver. This
way, the time-consuming data transfer is completed before
the handover, but the receiver can not yet start working on
the following task. On the sender side, the process data is
hashed to prove its state during handover.
#3 Bitcoin addresses are exchanged through PKI signatures to
provide a verifiable confirmation that the address is indeed
owned by the respective partner.
#4 A transaction template is created by the sender which holds
the negotiated handover terms (i.e., the required metadata
to completely describe the state of a process).
#5 The sender transmits the transaction template to the receiver
together with the symmetric key to unlock the process
data. The template is RSA-signed and sent. This way,
the receiver has proof that the sender intends to perform
the given handover. If the transaction template contains
the negotiated handover terms from Step #1, the receiver
approves the template by creating and returning a Bitcoin-
based signature of the template. For this signature, the
private key of the receiver’s Bitcoin address is used. Since
the receiver can now decrypt the process data, the execu-
tion of the next process task can be started.
#6 The sender validates the receiver’s signature. If the signa-
ture is correct, the transaction is finalized by adding the
Bitcoin-based signature of the sender. At last, the Bit-
coin transaction is submitted to the Bitcoin blockchain by
the sender. Eventually, the transaction is included in a
block, and thus becomes part of the persistent blockchain
data store. Since all Bitcoin transactions are broadcast and
shared publicly, even before they are included in a block,
the receiver can monitor if the sender actually submitted
the transaction. If the sender does not do so, the receiver
can contact the respective mediator of the choreography
(i.e., the process owner). The transaction template, signed
by the sender, serves as proof that a process handover was
intended by the two partners.
By observing the Bitcoin blockchain, the process owner can
monitor the progress of each process instance. Optionally, it
is possible for the owner to immediately collect more detailed
information about the latest progress of a process instance. For
example, initially the process owner hands over the process in-
stance to the first choreography participant, Alice. After com-
pleting the designated task, Alice performs a handover to the
next participant, Bob. Right after the new handover documen-
tation element is published, the process owner observes the
changes and can contact Alice to request Bob’s identity infor-
mation. This information collection is pull-based. This pro-
cess is further illustrated in Figure 3. The general structure of a
process-handover documentation element is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4a.
Transactions in Bitcoin typically require the payment of a
fee, which is specified as the difference between the Bitcoin
input amount and the output amount in a transaction. In our
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approach, the process owner supplies sufficient Bitcoins with
the process token to cover all transaction fees for the whole
process execution. This enables anonymity of the other parti-
cipants with respect to the information stored in the blockchain,
since they are not required to supply any Bitcoins to pay for
transaction fees – if they were, it would be possible to “follow
the money” in an attempt to de-anonymize participants. While
the size of the fee can be selected autonomously by the par-
ticipants, it is generally assumed that participants choose the
lowest possible fee that still ensures a timely inclusion of the
transaction into a new block.
4.1.4. Further Documentation Elements
To completely capture the execution of a process instance
that includes activities, exclusive-or (XOR) path decisions and
parallel execution paths (AND) [32], additional types of doc-
umentation elements (i.e. enriched transactions) are needed.
The controlled handover between process partners, as described
above, documents the execution of activities. Each handover
can mark the end of a previous activity and the start of a new
one. XOR path decisions do not require a dedicated documenta-
tion marker since they always resolve into one single execution
path. By analyzing the sequence of activities, a participant can
determine how the XOR path decision was resolved, e.g., by us-
ing real-time process conformance checking [33]. Besides this,
the following documentation elements are required: (i) start of
a process, (ii) end of a process, (iii) split into parallel execution,
and (iv) join from parallel execution.
The documentation element to start a process is submitted
by the process owner. It takes an arbitrary number of Bitcoin
inputs and outputs the token to be used for the process instance.
It further documents the process id, a timestamp and a specific
start-of-process marker. The timestamp of this transaction de-
fines the starting time of its given process instance. At last, a
change output can return any surplus Bitcoins. Thus, the trans-
action corresponding to this documentation element prepares
the process instance token. The token itself still remains under
Alice
handover(Process)
resp(Confirm)
Publish 
transaction
Perform
task
Process 
Owner
Bob
Monitor
Blockchain
handover(Process)
resp(Confirm)
Publish 
transaction
Perform
task
collect(nextParticipant)
resp(PKI-sign(Bitcoin_Address_Bob),
 Bob )
Figure 3: Pull-based Monitoring by Process Owner
the control of the process owner, i.e., the output which holds the
token still belongs to the process owner. The general structure
of a process-start transaction is illustrated in Figure 4b.
We assume that a process always starts and ends with a ded-
icated event published by the process owner. Since the process
owner usually expects some kind of result to be returned by
the participants of the choreography, the final process handover
should point back to the process owner. Therefore, the enriched
transaction to end a process, as shown in Figure 4c, is also sub-
mitted by the process owner. As input, it expects the token of
the process instance and optionally a data hash for documenta-
tion purposes. The token is no longer required for the runtime
verification framework and the output can be used for arbitrary
purposes. The transaction furthermore documents the process
id, a timestamp and a specific end-of-process marker. The time-
stamp of this transaction defines the ending time of the given
process instance. Input as well as output remain under the con-
trol of the process owner. The Bitcoins received through the
process token can then be used for new process instances.
To enable parallelism in processes, an enriched transaction to
split a process is required. This transaction is not meant to be
used to transfer process tokens between different participants.
Instead, only one participant, who decides to split a process,
creates the transaction. The single token input and at least two
token outputs are under the control of the current process token
holder. The number of outputs defines the number of paths the
process execution is split into. For each of the paths, the process
token owner can then add individual process-handover transac-
tions to other participants. In the split transaction, the process
id, a timestamp, and a specific split-of-process marker are doc-
umented. The timestamp of this transaction defines when the
given process instance was split into parallel paths. If a data
hash was contained from the previous task execution, this data
is documented along with the tokens. The general structure of
a process-split transaction is illustrated in Figure 4d.
We assume that every split leads to exactly one correspond-
ing join. To join parallel execution paths, an enriched trans-
action to join a process is required. Similar to the start, end,
and split transactions, the process-join transaction is not used
to transfer the ownership of a process token. When a choreo-
graphy participant accepts a process task which requires inputs
from multiple execution paths (i.e., it requires a process join),
the execution cannot proceed until control over all other exe-
cution paths also has been handed over to this specific parti-
cipant. When executing different process paths in parallel, one
path will always be the first one to finish. The process token of
this subpath is then handed over to a participant which agrees
to proceed the execution. All other participants must then also
handover their execution tokens to this specific participant. Fi-
nally, this participant merges all execution tokens into a single
token, with a dedicated process-join transaction. This transac-
tion expects at least two token inputs with optional data hashes
and provides a single token output. As usual, also the process
id, a timestamp and a specific join-of-process marker are added.
The timestamp of this transaction defines when the given pro-
cess instance was joined from parallel paths. The general struc-
ture of a process-join transaction is illustrated in Figure 4e.
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Figure 4: General Structures of Enriched Transactions
4.2. Realizing the Solution with Bitcoin Transactions
As outlined above, we use the Bitcoin blockchain to imple-
ment the conceptual solution presented in Section 4.1. To de-
scribe our implementation, first, the different types of Bitcoin
transactions are described (Section 4.2.1). Next, Section 4.2.2
defines how these transactions are adapted to serve as process
verification transactions.
4.2.1. Bitcoin Transaction Types
Only two elements in a Bitcoin transaction do not have a de-
fined length and can be filled with arbitrary contents: The script
locking an output, historically called scriptPubKey, and the un-
locking script provided by an input, historically called script-
Sig. In this paper, these two scripts will be referred to as locking
script and unlocking script [34].
For these scripts, Bitcoin defines a custom scripting lan-
guage. While the language is on purpose not Turing-complete,
it still enables extensive variants of programs. Only if all lock-
ing and unlocking scripts of a transaction match one out of five
different predefined structures, the received transaction is re-
garded as “standard”. This results in five different types of Bit-
coin transactions which are solely distinguished by the structure
of their locking and unlocking scripts.
Currently, the Bitcoin software discards all incoming transac-
tions that are sent across the Bitcoin network which are not re-
garded as standard. This means that all miner nodes which run
an instance of the Bitcoin software will not accept non-standard
transactions. Therefore, to include a non-standard transaction
into the Bitcoin blockchain, one must first find a miner that ac-
cepts non-standard transactions. In addition, this specific miner
then must win the race of creating a new block, which can take a
very long time. Although it is not explicitly prohibited to create
and publish non-standard transactions, it has become de facto
very difficult to integrate them into the blockchain. Hence, the
usage of non-standard transactions is not an option for our so-
lution.
Only two of the five standard transaction types provide the
possibility to insert arbitrary data and still be considered as
standard [34]. The other three transaction types are called Pay-
to-Public-Key-Hash (P2PKH), Pay-to-Public-Key and Multi-
Signature. These three transaction types define specific script
structures and therefore only serve one specific use case,
namely payment. The two standard transaction types which
still allow a certain degree of freedom are data output and Pay-
to-Script-Hash (P2SH), which are therefore used in our work.
data output is the only standard type without a direct purpose
for payment. It is designed to serve as simple and limited data
field. To directly place data in a transaction, a specialized out-
put with zero Bitcoins must be created. Since the only purpose
of this output is to contain data, it should never be referenced
by an input or carry value.
To ensure that this output is never successfully consumed by
a new input, its locking script must never evaluate to true. This
is achieved by simply placing the OP RETURN operator at the
top of the script. When this operator is executed, it immediately
stops the execution. At that point, the value true is not on top
of the stack, therefore the validation fails. Miners therefore can
safely archive this kind of unspent output and do not have to
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Figure 5: Structure of Process Data in a Bitcoin Data Output
keep it in memory. As of version 0.11 of the Bitcoin software,
it is allowed to store up to 80 bytes of information in such data
output and only one data output is allowed per transaction.
The P2SH type is a powerful transaction type to conduct
payments. Amongst others, it allows the controlled usage of
non-standard scripts. In contrast to the strictly defined P2PKH
transaction type structure, the P2SH transaction type enables
the usage of various payment scripts. To allow miners to save
memory, the locking script of P2SH transactions remains short
and strictly defined. It is the unlocking script which can con-
tain arbitrary data. P2PKH locking scripts require a signature, a
public key, and an entire redeem script followed by the redeem
script’s own parameters as parameters. In contrast, the locking
script of a P2SH transaction is a simple hash value comparison.
Upon creating a P2SH output, the transaction publisher must
decide which script should be provided for unlocking the out-
put and hash it. This hash is then placed in the locking script.
To unlock an output with such a defined script, a redeem
script which matches the placed hash must be provided. In addi-
tion, this provided redeem script itself is evaluated and must re-
solve to true. This feature is normally used for Multi-Signature
scripts which tend to be quite long. When used in the P2SH
variant, they save memory for the miners. The P2SH valida-
tion is then performed in two stages: First, the provided redeem
script is compared against the defined hash. Second, the redeem
script itself is evaluated with its parameters.
4.2.2. Handover Transaction Implementation
To store the process information required for a handover be-
tween two participants in the Bitcoin blockchain, as defined in
Section 4.1.3, the two transaction types data output and P2SH
are used. The elements process id, task id, timestamp and re-
ceiver signature are included in a transaction by using a data
output element. By using a simple adapted P2SH output, the
process data hash can also be included. The only downside of
using P2SH elements is that the stored data can only be placed
in the redeem script. This redeem script is part of the unlocking
script which becomes only visible on the blockchain after the
output has been spent, i.e., another transaction consumed the
output by placing the redeem script on the blockchain.
The 80 bytes storage of the data output element are divided as
depicted in Figure 5: The first byte is used to store the length of
the stored data block, which may vary depending on the process
transaction type. Next, two bytes are reserved to store the pro-
cess instance id. This enables the definition of 65, 535 unique
process instances in this kind of runtime verification. To store
the task id, one byte is reserved. Therefore, 255 different tasks
can be defined inside a process model. The task id is followed
by the timestamp with a length of 4 byte. At last, the Bitcoin
signature of the receiver is placed. The length of this signature
is not fixed but commonly ranges between 71-72 bytes. This
results in a data block with a total length of 79-80 bytes.
The process data hash does not fit into the data output ele-
ment. Therefore, a P2SH transaction has to be used to store
it. At the same time, such P2SH outputs are used to transfer
process instance tokens. Therefore, also the access restriction
features of a P2PKH transaction are required. To achieve this,
a P2PKH script with an optional data hash is used as redeem
script. The data hash itself does not add any specific functional-
ity to the script, so we just place it on the blockchain as a string
of characters. Bitcoin provides a script command (OP DROP),
which we use to ensure that the hash is removed from the stack
before the actual P2PKH script is executed. The inclusion of
the data hash is optional.
As mentioned before, the process data hash is placed on the
blockchain only after the given output has been consumed, i.e.,
the given token has been passed on. The redeem script hash
placed in the P2SH locking script ensures that only a correct
process data hash can be placed in the redeem script. Fur-
thermore, it is guaranteed that before a handover transaction
can be published, both process participants are in possession of
the process data in its current state. The receiver of a process
handover is able to verify that the given P2SH output incorpo-
rates the correct process data hash. In addition, the sender of
a process handover can provide the data hash when the process
owner demands it. This way, a process owner can also verify
that a data hash has been stored, even if the corresponding token
output has not yet been passed on.
The general steps to perform a handover between two parti-
cipants have already been illustrated in Figure 2. In Step #4,
a handover-transaction template is created by the sender of
the handover which includes almost all required process data.
This template is only missing two signatures, one from the re-
ceiver and one from the sender. Upon receiving the template,
the handover receiver is able to validate the correctness of the
following critical requirements:
INPUT#1 contains redeem script: INPUT#1 references the
output of a previous transaction. This output must contain
a P2SH locking script. The unlocking script, currently in-
cluded in the template, is still missing parameters (i.e., the
sender signature and public key) but the redeem script it-
self is already complete. Therefore, the handover receiver
is able to validate the correctness of the redeem script, thus
also the correctness of the included data hash of the last
transaction.
OUTPUT#1 can be retrieved: Though the data of OUT-
PUT#1 is abstracted by a P2SH script, the handover re-
ceiver knows the defined structure of the script. In addi-
tion, all required data to check the correctness of the in-
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cluded script hash is already known. The redeem script
is constructed from the hash of the receiver’s public key
and the hash of the already transferred process data. By
recreating the redeem script and comparing it to the hash
placed in OUTPUT#1, the handover receiver ensures that
the token is indeed correctly passed on and that the hash
of the just received process data is correct.
OUTPUT#2 contains the negotiated process data: Except
for the process data hash, all negotiated data is included
in OUTPUT#2, as shown in Figure 5. Therefore, the
correctness of the included data can be directly verified.
Previous process execution is valid: The handover receiver
also obtains the process model. Since INPUT#1 is refer-
encing a previous process transaction, the receiver is able
to trace the execution history of the process instance. Be-
sides other meta-information about the process, it can be
determined if the process execution still conforms with the
defined process model.
If the received handover template is successfully verified, the
handover receiver signs it. For the signature, the same Bit-
coin key-pair is used that has been utilized to receive the token
in OUTPUT#1. The technical structure of a process-handover
transaction is illustrated in Figure 4a which follows the general
description of the transaction provided in Section 4.1.3.
It is also possible to incorporate other types of redeem scripts
inside the P2SH script. Fault management strategies can be em-
ployed through the usage of the Multi-Signature type script in-
stead of the P2PKH type script. While the P2PKH script can
only be configured to be unlocked by the new token owner, a
Multi-Signature script can be unlocked by multiple different
parties. In case a fault occurs during a process, an escalation
strategy has to be employed by the process owner. To enable the
process owner to intercept a process token in the case of incor-
rect execution, a Multi-Signature script can be placed as redeem
script in the P2SH locking script. The script then grants access
for two parties instead of one, namely the next token owner and
the process owner. For instance, if the new token owner stops
responding and does not perform the negotiated task, the pro-
cess owner could decide to collect the token instead. However,,
fault management is out of scope for the work at hand. There-
fore, in the proposed prototype only simple P2PKH scripts are
employed as redeem scripts.
4.3. Runtime Verification Framework and Implementation
We developed a Java-based software framework that imple-
ments the runtime verification approach as described above.
This framework is designed to abstract all implementation de-
tails to simplify its integration into any arbitrary choreography-
oriented BPMS. The framework is further enhanced by using a
simple payment verification (SPV) Bitcoin client as slim foun-
dation, a remote REST API for data collection, and a greedy
publishing mode. While these features are not essential for the
implementation of the proposed concepts, they increase the us-
ability and testability of the prototype.
During the handover of a choreography, the receiving parti-
cipants want to verify the execution path of the instance prior
to the handover. Therefore, they need to be able to obtain in-
formation about old transactions that have been submitted to
the network or are currently pending. Since the implementation
proposed by this work relies on a SPV foundation, only block
hashes and transactions directly related to the client’s wallet are
monitored. To obtain information about transactions unrelated
to the wallet, a separate data collection framework has to be
used. Many different companies, e.g., blockchain.info2, Block-
cypher3, or Blocktrail4 provide live access to Bitcoin informa-
tion through remote REST APIs. By calling these REST in-
terfaces, slim Bitcoin clients can obtain information about any
confirmed or still pending transaction in the Bitcoin network.
This way, clients are able to reconstruct the execution of a pro-
cess instance without running a full Bitcoin node. For the pro-
totypical implementation in this paper, the REST API of Block-
cypher is used.
The required proof of work for the creation of new blocks in
Bitcoin is configured to result in a median block creation time
of ten minutes. Unfortunately, there is a lot of variation in the
time between block creations. The time between the arrival of
two blocks roughly follows an exponential distribution. There
may be mere seconds between the creation of two blocks or
even an hour [35]. If too many transactions are published at the
same time or if blocks are created too slowly, published trans-
actions must be buffered by the miners of the Bitcoin network.
On average, approximately 1,500 transactions are currently in-
cluded in a new block.5 If there are more than 1,500 transac-
tions queued to be included in a new block, some transactions
might need to wait two or even three block creation intervals
until they are confirmed. Also, the fees offered by each trans-
action affect their confirmation time. Transactions with higher
fees are treated with higher priority. This results in an even
higher variation for the confirmation time of transactions [35].
Therefore, the transaction confirmation time is expected to be
a major challenge for a runtime verification approach based on
the Bitcoin blockchain. The conservative approach to runtime
verification would be to wait for the confirmation of each pub-
lished transaction before appending new transactions to it. For
long-running processes with long intervals between handovers,
like supply chain processes, this is sufficient. But it constitutes
a bottleneck for fast-running processes with short tasks between
handovers, like software computations.
Therefore, we include a greedy publishing mode into our
framework. This greedy approach allows to append new trans-
actions to a process, even though the latest ones have not been
confirmed yet. Nevertheless, since these transactions are broad-
cast across the Bitcoin network and buffered by the miners, they
can be retrieved by process participants. Choreography parti-
cipants are still able to verify the validity of a transaction for a
2https://blockchain.info/de/api
3https://api.blockcypher.com
4https://www.blocktrail.com/api
5https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions-per-block?
timespan=1year, accessed: 15.01.2017
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given process instance. Also, Bitcoin miners accept new trans-
actions which reference unconfirmed transactions as input. It
is possible to create whole chains of unconfirmed transactions,
enabling the participants of a shared process instance to con-
tinue with the process execution even though not all process
transactions have been included into the blockchain yet.
By using this approach, the execution of a fast-pacing pro-
cess is not delayed. Furthermore, multiple chained transac-
tions can be confirmed at once in a single block. Through this
method, less blocks have to be created to confirm all published
transactions of a process instance. In addition, each participant
is in possession of the complete process execution chain and
can prove that handovers of the process instance took place that
were confirmed by both handover partners. The risk of this
approach is that a whole chain of pending transaction may be
dropped if something goes wrong.
If one intermediate transaction of the pending chain is some-
how lost, the whole remaining chain is also dropped since it
became invalid. Each published transaction is flooded through
the Bitcoin network and stored in the buffers of various miners.
Even during a conflict in the blockchain, where it may occur
that single blocks are dropped, the transactions should still re-
main in the pending buffer. The highest threat for this greedy
approach is malicious behavior of one of the participants. Each
participant is theoretically able to publish an alternative version
of an intermediate transaction in the pending chain. In this case,
two alternative transactions become available for a single out-
put. It is undefined which transaction will be included in the
blockchain. If the alternative transaction of the malicious par-
ticipant is chosen, the remaining pending transaction chain is
dropped. On the contrary, it is very unlikely that the alternative
transaction, published by the malicious participant, is a valid
handover transaction. The malicious participant still requires
another participant to confirm the handover. At the same time,
this participant can easily verify that another process transac-
tion is already pending for the given token output. At last, the
alternative transaction also documents which participant caused
the disruption, resulting in penalties and loss of reputation. The
definition and implementation of such fault management and
fallback mechanisms remains part of our future work.
Greedy publishing aims to enable fast-paced processes in the
slow running environment of the Bitcoin blockchain. To enable
this feature in conjunction with an SPV client also requires the
usage of a remote REST API to fetch additional information.
If a full node would be used, the feature of greedy publishing
would still be possible but the usage of the remote REST API
could be reduced. Since the full node receives and buffers most
pending transactions itself, the REST API would only be re-
quired for exceptions.
5. Evaluation
To evaluate the applicability of the presented solution for
choreography runtime verification, we implemented our ap-
proach as a research prototype. The prototype6 was imple-
mented using Java JDK 1.8, Apache Maven 3.3.9 for depen-
dency management, Spring Beans 4.2.6 for dependency injec-
tions, Apache HttpClient 4.5.2 and Google Gson 2.7 for the
REST API, BitcoinJ 0.14.2 as the Bitcoin API, and JUnit 4.12
for testing purposes.
We evaluate our work in terms of a qualitative comparison
to existing solutions (Section 5.1) and conduct a performance
evaluation (Section 5.2).
5.1. Qualitative Evaluation
Choreographies operate as decentralized systems. The more
heterogeneous, geographically decentralized, and organization-
ally independent such systems become, the more dynamic and
diverse they are. Therefore, in choreography-oriented BPM,
many unique situations have to be foreseen by a verification
approach [3, 17, 36]. For instance, process participants might
become unavailable, tasks might be processed incorrectly, or
participants might compete with each other. In order not to
limit according fault management strategies, a runtime verific-
ation system must remain as flexible as possible. In this paper,
the term flexibility is therefore used to describe the capability of
a runtime verification system to deal with the dynamic nature
of decentralized choreographies and the process participants.
Following approaches for qualitative comparison as pre-
sented, e.g., in [37, 38], we have extracted the following com-
parison criteria for choreography runtime verification. Table 1
shows how approaches from the state of the art (introduced in
Section 3) and our own solution fulfill the discussed criteria. In
addition, the technical approaches to realize a verification trust
basis are named.
Participant Selection. A major influence on the stability of a
decentralized process instance is the selection of the par-
ticipants [17, 36]. Predefining process participants before
runtime greatly reduces the organizational efforts during
process execution. At the same time, a process instance
becomes less robust, since participants cannot be replaced
during runtime. In a predefined setting, a process instance
may halt in this case. An alternative is to select the re-
quired participants ad hoc during process execution. Espe-
cially for long-running processes where participants may
have to wait a long time before they are involved, this flex-
ible approach can increase the overall robustness.
Information Sharing. If choreography-oriented process exe-
cution takes place as cooperation between independent
participants, information sharing becomes an issue [6, 11].
In particular, participants of B2B choreographies might
6The software can be downloaded at https:
//github.com/ChristophPrybilaTUVienna/
ChoreographyRuntimeVerificationByBlockchain.
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Table 1: Criteria Application to State of the Art Approaches
Participant Participant Data Internal Structure Discovery of Sequence Verification
Selection Identities Sharing Sharing Sharing Incorrect Behavior Enforcement Trust Basis
Bengtsson et al., 2005 [22] On-Demand All All Not required Semi-supported Not Supported Signature-
enhanced
Token
Montagut et al., 2008 [17] Predefined Minimum Minimum Not required Semi-supported Supported Cryptographic
Onion
Von Riegen et al., 2009 [11] On-Demand Minimum Minimum Unknown Supported Supported Enterprise
Service Bus
Baouab et al., 2011 [6] Predefined Minimum Minimum Unknown Semi-supported Supported Message
Interception
Lim et al., 2012 [23] On-Demand All All Not required Semi-supported Not Supported Hierarchical
Signatures
Hwang et al., 2013 [25] On-Demand Minimum Minimum Not required Supported Supported Centralized
Cloud
Storage
Weber et al,. 2016 [19] Predefined Minimum Mixed Not required Supported Supported Blockchain
This Work, 2017 On-Demand Minimum All Not required Supported Not Supported Blockchain
even be competitors. Therefore, it becomes a requirement
to share as little information as possible with other parti-
cipants. With regard to the work at hand, it is important
to evaluate which internal information is absolutely neces-
sary. The less information is shared, the more acceptable
the system becomes for independent participants.
Some state of the art runtime verification approaches re-
quire that the identities of all participants are shared be-
tween all process participants, while other approaches ex-
plicitly foresee that only minimum information about pro-
cess participants is shared. Analogue considerations ap-
ply with regard to general data sharing, i.e., that not all
process-related data needs to be shared with all process
participants, and with regard to (company-)internal struc-
ture sharing. We discuss these concerns in the following.
In a choreography, the process owner has to know the iden-
tities of all participants. Since a process instance is passed
along the participants, in general each participant knows
at least two other participants, i.e., the previous and the
subsequent process participants (although they may be the
same in some cases). We refer to this setup as “Minimum”
(see Table 1) with regard to participant identities sharing.
Some verification approaches require the complete sharing
of identities between the participants, which we define as
sharing “All” participant identities.
With regard to data sharing, the process owner will in
most cases send some data along with the process instance.
Each process task may require and alter this data. Since
each task may be executed by a different process parti-
cipant, a given participant may only know the state of the
process data before and after the task has been executed.
This setup can be defined as “Minimum” for process data
sharing. Some verification approaches enable all parti-
cipants to view the content, or trace the complete evolution
of the shared data, which can be defined as sharing “All”
data whereas “Mixed” is in between these two extremes.
With regard to internal structure sharing, approaches are
graded according to their invasiveness. A purely token-
based approach is considered very lightweight, since no
dedicated infrastructure needs to be installed at the parti-
cipants. Message-based approaches require dedicated re-
sources (e.g., a service bus, filtering components). Some
of these resources are operated/provided by third parties.
If they are integrated into the BPMS of a process parti-
cipant, this third party requires internal structure sharing.
Correctness Verification. A runtime verification framework
should support the discovery of incorrect process execu-
tion. It must not be possible for a participant to conduct in-
correct behavior during the execution of a choreography-
oriented process instance without being noticed by the pro-
cess owner or other process participants. We refer to an
approach from the related work as “semi-supported” when
that incorrect behavior can be discovered in ideal scenar-
ios, but can become impossible in situations like the loss
of a process token. In addition to this feature, some run-
time verification frameworks are able to apply even stricter
constraints: the enforcement of execution sequences for
process instances means that illegitimately ordered tasks
are rejected by the system.
When comparing our own approach with the related work (see
Table 1), two aspects require further explanation. First, our ap-
proach requires a higher degree of data sharing than existing
approaches. In fact, restricting data sharing has not been in the
focus of our work, therefore all process-related data is shared
with the other process participants. Second, since process mod-
els are not incorporated in the logic of a process transaction, the
sequence of performed tasks can not be enforced. However, it
is possible for the process owner to realize ex post if the correct
process path has been taken by all participants.
In summary, the perfect approach for runtime verification in
choreography-oriented BPM has not been found yet. Many
approaches utilize tokens that are passed along the parti-
cipants during process execution to document and/or control
the progress of a choreography [17, 22, 23, 25]. In token-only
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approaches, participants have to be predefined to subsequently
protect the privacy of identity and data. Furthermore, the execu-
tion sequence can only be enforced in this way. All token-only
approaches suffer from limited discovery of incorrect behavior.
Since the token is the only element of proof that work was done,
the communication of this token is critical. A token might get
intercepted or lost. Finally, a process owner is only able to mon-
itor the progress of a choreography if the intermediary token is
returned periodically.
Other approaches aim to control the messages that are passed
between the participants [6, 11, 25]. To enable this, different
communication and control facilities have to be established. As
depicted in Table 1, these proposals provide a number of ben-
efits. On the downside, the additionally required facilities be-
come the new shared trust basis. If the facilities are owned by a
particular entity, then all participants need to trust this entity.
Recent approaches like the one presented by Weber et al. [19]
or the work at hand aim to overcome the issue of the shared
trust basis by incorporating a blockchain. On this basis, novel
solutions are able to provide complete discovery of incorrect
behavior and to fully protect the internal technical structure of
the participants. At the same time, the respective blockchain
serves as secure, independent and decentralized basis of trust.
Weber et al. [19] require the participants to be selected in ad-
vance. In turn, the proposed solution is able to partially protect
the confidentiality of process data and to enforce the execution
sequence of the processes. Our approach exhibits greater flex-
ibility by enabling an on-demand participant selection. How-
ever, our approach is not able to provide confidentiality for the
shared data and the correct execution sequence can not be en-
forced. In addition, the approaches differ in terms of the used
blockchain technology, as discussed in Section 3.
5.2. Performance Evaluation
To assess the impact of the runtime verification feature on
the performance of choreographies, we have conducted various
experiments with the implemented solution. This way, an esti-
mation about the solution’s impact on process instances can be
made. In the following subsections, we describe our evaluation
setup (Section 5.2.1), the evaluation results (Section 5.2.2), and
discuss the results (Section 5.2.3).
5.2.1. Evaluation Setup
Table 2: Characteristics of Evaluation Process Models
Process No. |Steps| |XOR| |AND|
#1 3 0 0
#2 4 1 0
#3 4 0 1
#4 5 1 1
We evaluate the performance of our approach with regard to
three distinct factors: (i) The cost occurring due to the usage
of the Bitcoin blockchain as a decentralized, trustworthy ledger
which documents the process transactions, (ii) the runtime per-
formance overhead of our verification approach (compared to
evaluation runs without verification), and (iii) the ability of the
framework to detect incorrect executions.
To measure if the structure of a choreography influences the
runtime behavior of our verification approach, four different
process models have been applied in our evaluation. In gen-
eral, every business process model which contains at least two
tasks is a suitable candidate for a runtime verification system.
To maximize the verification effort for our prototype, every task
is carried out by a distinct participant. Table 2 shows the ba-
sic characteristics of the evaluated process models, i.e., how
many steps they contain and whether they include AND-blocks,
XOR-blocks, or a combination of both. AND-blocks and XOR-
blocks cover both splits and merges in the process models.
To start, control, and end a single evaluation run, a small Java
application operates as the main controlling entity. In order to
deliver deterministic results, the application expects a number
of input parameters to configure the evaluation runs, namely:
(i) a process model ID, (ii) a definition of the different variants,
e.g., if an XOR gateway is part of a model, (iii) a verification
flag which determines if runtime verification should be carried
out or not, and (iv) a greedy flag which determines if the greedy
mode as discussed in Section 4.3 is applied. Using these param-
eters, we are able to set the path through a process model, the
participants who are responsible for carrying out specific tasks,
and what data is produced by certain tasks.
5.2.2. Evaluation Results
In total, 122 process instances were executed, leading to the
publication of 450 transactions enriched with process metadata
to the Bitcoin blockchain. The total execution time of all pro-
cess instances amounts to 50.551 hours, which includes waiting
periods for transaction confirmations. Each published transac-
tion must reach at least a confirmation depth of 1 before an
execution is considered finished.
Approximately 0.085417 Bitcoins were spent on fees for the
transactions of the experiment. On 31 August 2016, the cur-
rency exchange rate of Bitcoin (BTC) to Euro was 1 BTC
= e 512.8969.7 The cost to fuel the transactions in fiat cur-
rency therefore amounts to approximately e 43.81. Consider-
ing that 450 transactions were published during the simulation,
the average fee of a Bitcoin transaction enriched with process
metadata results to 0.000189816 BTC or e 0.09735581.
To create a baseline for the impact of our proposed run-
time verification framework, the business process models de-
scribed in Table 2 were executed as choreographies without the
blockchain-based runtime verification. Table 3 presents the re-
sulting mean execution times of the different evaluation runs.
Without the runtime verification framework, the duration of the
evaluation runs is very consistent. In comparison to the mean
duration, the standard deviation (σ) is very small. These base-
line values are compared to evaluation runs with the runtime
verification framework included.
We then executed evaluation runs with and without the pro-
posed greedy mode enabled. We expected that these evaluation
7http://api.coindesk.com/v1/bpi/historical/close.json?
currency=EUR&start=2016-08-31&end=2016-08-31
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Figure 6: Bar Chart Comparing Durations of the Baseline and the non-Greedy
Evaluation Runs
runs exhibit a higher standard deviation due to their dependency
on the Bitcoin blockchain.
In order to demonstrate that the proposed runtime verification
framework is capable of detecting errors, a number of processes
include corrupted handovers. Hence, not all evaluation runs are
suited for the overall time impact comparison of the runtime
verification prototype. Therefore, not all 32 evaluation run con-
figurations we have applied are listed in Tables 3, 4a and 4b,
and thus the numbers of transactions in Tables 4a and 4b do not
amount t the to al of 450 submitted transactions.
The following paragraphs discuss the results of the runtime
verification framework without the greedy mode. Afterwards,
the impact of the runtime verification framework if the greedy
mode is activated is also analyzed.
Non-Greedy Mode Results. Table 4a shows the mean execution
times of the runtime verification-based evaluation runs with-
out greedy mode. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the dura-
tions of the baseline without verification and the non-greedy
approach. The large overhead caused by the runtime verifica-
tion can be partially traced back to REST API requests and log-
ical tasks carried out by the framework, but the biggest part is
the duration of the transaction confirmation. In further tests, we
have measured that the latter is responsible for 99.42% of the
mean duration of non-greedy runtime verification steps, while
the framework logic takes only 0.05% and the REST API re-
Table 3: Verification-less Process Runs (Baseline, without Blockchain)
Process Tasks Evaluation Mean Standard
No. Covered Runs Duration [s] Deviation (σ)
#1 3 3 15.544 0.074
#1 2 3 10.468 0.012
#2 3 3 15.510 0.048
#2 3 3 15.553 0.130
#2 1 3 5.016 0.001
#3 4 3 18.016 0
#3 4 3 18.016 0
#3 3 3 13.021 0.007
#4 4 3 15.592 0.049
#4 4 3 15.548 0.015
#4 4 3 16.570 1.400
#4 4 3 15.539 0.023
Table 4: Verification Framework Process Evaluation Runs (using Blockchain)
(a) In non-Greedy Mode
Process Tasks Evaluation Total # Mean Standard
No. Covered Runs of Tasks Duration
[s]
Deviation
(σ)
#1 6 2 12 5,501 936
#2 6 4 24 3,489 1,110
#3 10 4 40 7,835 2,309
#4 10 4 40 9,974 6,136
#4 9-10 4 37 7,538 3,444
#4 9 4 36 9,592 3,107
Total 189
(b) In Greedy Mode
Process Tasks Evaluation Total # Mean Standard
No. Covered Runs of Tasks Duration
[s]
Deviation
(σ)
#1 6 4 24 707 430
#1 3 6 18 650 945
#2 5-6 4 21 711 306
#2 4 5 20 4,050 7,251
#3 9-10 4 39 542 221
#4 10 3 30 2,830 2,040
#4 11 5 55 1,155 646
Total 207
quests take 0.53%. These results show that waiting for a trans-
action to confirm takes up the most time if using the runtime
verification framework in non-greedy mode. Still, knowing the
mean duration for a process task does not enable estimations
of the expected increase in overall execution duration. This be-
comes obvious when the mean evaluation run durations from
Tables 4a and 4b are compared with respect to their respec-
tive standard deviations σ. The execution durations of both
modes have a very high standard deviation in comparison to
their means. Therefore, even if the number of required record-
ing steps of a process instance is known in advance, the exhib-
ited execution duration varies significantly.
Hence, we analyzed the process transaction confirmation
time in greater detail. The distribution of all non-greedy trans-
action confirmation waiting durations is illustrated as a box
plot in Figure 7a. A median transaction confirmation time of
7.74 minutes was recorded for all process transactions in the
non-greedy mode. This is even slightly faster than the median
confirmation time of 10 minutes the Bitcoin network is config-
ured to exhibit. Still, a lot of outliers were recorded. One par-
ticular transaction took 172.78 minutes to confirm. This result
is not surprising, given the fact that the Bitcoin block creation
duration is distributed approximately exponentially [35].
Greedy Mode Results. As can be seen in Figure 8 and Table 4b,
when operating in greedy mode, the runtime verification frame-
work still exhibits a significant increase in execution duration
of the executed processes in comparison to the verification-less
baseline. However, the impact of the verification framework on
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the execution duration is somewhat reduced in comparison the
non-greedy evaluation runs.
Again, the only difference between the baseline process exe-
cution and the greedy runtime verification execution is the con-
ducted documentation of the single process tasks steps in the
Bitcoin blockchain. Analogue to the non-greedy mode, we have
analyzed which activities lead to the increase. For the greedy
mode, the transaction broadcast takes 42.03% of the overall du-
ration, while the framework logic takes 12.47% and the REST
API requests take 45.50%. This is a much more diverse result
than discussed above for the non-greedy mode. The REST API
requests and the Bitcoin transaction broadcasts have roughly
the same impact to the duration of a single process task. Fur-
thermore, the mean duration of 12.3 seconds is much lower than
the 879.68 seconds of the non-greedy mode. The framework
can potentially be even faster when being operated on top of a
full Bitcoin node instead of SPV wallet. This would remove the
need for the REST API requests. Most importantly, the process
instances and their included tasks could be executed faster.
However, the collective waiting time for the transaction con-
firmations also has to be taken into account. A process instance
is only considered finished when its submitted transactions have
reached at least a confirmation depth of 1. The mean execu-
tion duration of the greedy evaluation runs is 1, 520.68 seconds.
This duration comprises broadcasting, REST API requests, and
framework logic (8.62%) and the single transaction confirma-
tion waiting period (91.38%). As we can see, even though
the greedy mode was able to reduce the duration of the pro-
cess instances, the transaction confirmation duration remains
the greatest impact factor.
The distribution of the transaction confirmation waiting times
of greedily published transactions is illustrated as a box plot in
Figure 7b. The greedily published process transactions exhibit
a median transaction confirmation time of 8.76 minutes. Simi-
lar to the results of the non-greedily published process transac-
tions, a large number of outliers occurred. The recorded maxi-
mum confirmation duration is 309.18 minutes.
The median transaction confirmation time of the greedy
mode results is slightly higher than the median transaction con-
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Figure 8: Bar Chart Comparing Durations of the Baseline and the Greedy Eval-
uation Runs
firmation time of the non-greedy mode results. Our experimen-
tal data does not allow to determine if this deviation is related
to the chaining of unconfirmed transactions. The deviation be-
tween the two median confirmation durations can also be ex-
plained through the (roughly) exponential distribution of Bit-
coin’s block creation time.
The capability of the runtime verification framework to de-
tect incorrect executions was also evaluated. A number of eval-
uation runs were configured to purposefully exhibit incorrect
behavior at a random handover between choreography parti-
cipants. To perform incorrect behavior, a participant tries to
handover a process instance to another participant with the in-
structions to execute a task which does not fit the current stage
of the execution. This is a valid attack scenario, since the task
which is supposed to be executed by the receiving participant is
documented by the handover transaction that is signed by both
the sending and the receiving participant. When a receiving
participant detects such an incorrect behavior during a hand-
over, it aborts the handover process. Therefore, this participant
also does not sign the process handover template proposed by
the sending participant, and the sending participant is not able
to publish a correct process handover transaction. When the
sending participant is notified that the receiver recognized the
incorrect handover, it ends the execution of the process instance
by publishing an extraordinary process-end transaction. During
our evaluation runs, all incorrect executions were detected.
5.2.3. Discussion
In both the non-greedy and greedy choreography execution
results, waiting for the published transactions to be confirmed
has by far the highest impact on the performance of the pro-
posed runtime verification framework. This factor is very un-
predictable, since the Bitcoin transaction confirmation duration
is distributed approximately exponentially [35].
Especially in the more secure non-greedy operation mode,
the runtime verification increased the execution duration of a
process. During the conducted evaluation, a median transaction
confirmation time of 7.74 minutes was recorded. This shows
that the runtime verification prototype is best-suited for use
cases with long-running tasks. In B2B processes with tasks
that take a very long time, the duration increase generated by
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blockchain-based runtime verification is of relatively small sig-
nificance. Exemplary real-world use cases that fit this descrip-
tion include logistic and supply chain processes.
The greedy execution mode of the prototype was able to re-
duce the overall duration by a factor of about 56 in compari-
son to the non-greedy execution mode. This improvement was
achieved even though the median transaction confirmation du-
ration of the non-greedily published transaction was lower than
the median of the greedily published transactions. While the
framework has to wait for the confirmation of each non-greedy
transaction independently, the chained greedy transactions only
have one overlapping waiting time. This increase in perfor-
mance is traded against a reduced level of security, as explained
in Section 4.3. Nevertheless, real-world business processes
that include a series of very short tasks could incorporate run-
time verification that operates in the greedy mode. Examples
for such business process are software-centric processes which,
e.g., performing a series of calculation steps.
Due to the high standard deviation of the transaction confir-
mation duration, the collected results were not suited to con-
struct a practical prediction metric, and this data should not be
used to estimate the expected increase of the execution duration
of processes instances. For an applicable approach to this, we
refer to [39].
Last but not least, with regard to our evaluation setup, some
limitations have been assumed to simplify the implementation
and should therefore be named. First, a process must only have
one start and one end node, which can be achieved by pro-
cess transformation [40]. Second, a process must be started and
ended by the process owner. Since the end-process transaction
cannot be used to transfer token ownership, the token must be
under the control of the process owner prior to publishing it. If
the last task of a business process is not executed by the process
owner, the token must be transferred to the process owner in an
extraordinary handover transaction. In the evaluation, these ex-
traordinary transactions are called filler tasks and were not fur-
ther mentioned, since filler tasks are not related to any process
task and serve only as a mechanism to transfer token owner-
ship. Due to this compromise, it is possible that evaluation runs
incorporated more steps than defined in the process model.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach to runtime veri-
fication for process instances which are executed in a decentral-
ized, choreography-based way. To enable the necessary docu-
mentation of process state updates, we propose to use block-
chain technology, which allows the establishment of a decen-
tralized trust basis. We have shown that a first generation block-
chain like Bitcoin can be utilized as the foundation for runtime
verification for business processes.
Furthermore, we have performed a qualitative comparison of
our solution with state of the art approaches and conducted a
performance analysis to determine the resulting runtime over-
head. In the qualitative comparison, we have shown that our
approach increases trust by applying a trustworthy, decentral-
ized verification trust basis, while providing a large degree of
flexibility. However, our approach does not take into account
confidentiality of shared data.
Because of the measured runtime overhead and the unpre-
dictability of transaction confirmation times in the Bitcoin
blockchain, our approach is primarily suitable for long-running
real-world processes, e.g., in logistics or manufacturing, where
the overhead only plays a minor role. However, we have also
shown that by providing a greedy variant of the runtime verific-
ation approach, the overhead can be significantly reduced. This
improvement comes at the cost of a reduced level of security.
The usage of blockchain for verification purposes is in an
early stage, and there are many different possible research di-
rections which need to be considered in the future. Concretely,
we will investigate the realization of fault management mech-
anisms by the usage of Multi-Signature redeem scripts as well
as the integration of further process patterns, e.g., loops.
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